Introduction
Of the possible sources of fundamental rights in the EU legal order, Article 6 TEU lists three: the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union under Article 6(1) TEU, which 'shall have the same legal value as the Treaties'; the Eu ropean Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), to which Article 6(2) TEU pro vides for a legal basis for the EU accession; and fundamental rights as general principles of law under Article 6(3) TEU. Additionally, the fundamental freedoms arising in the context of the TFEU are, in practice, treated as rights with equal status to a fundamental right in the EU legal order. 1 This plurality of sources of rights raises questions as to the relationship between them in case of conflict. In the following article we focus on one practically relevant but theoretically under developed subaspect of this problem: The relation between fundamental rights defined in the Charter and those arising as general principles of EU law (Article 6(1) and (3) TEU). 2 We discuss in the first part the relationship of these two sources of law and whether, in particular, one of the sources should be subsidiary to the other. The second part of this article looks at these questions by means of the test case of the right to good administration. Good administration is a telling example for the reallife relevance of the general questions raised in this article since the material, personal and institutional scope of the right in Article 41 CFR is defined in a significantly more limited way than the general principle of good administration such as it has been developed in the caselaw of the EU courts. We argue that a pluralistic understanding of the relationship between the various sources of fundamental rights has the potential to help preserving the dynamic nature of the EU law and contributes to the protection of the individuals' funda mental rights in view of the challenges and complexities of the ongoing EU in tegration.
The Charter and fundamental rights as general principles
The relationship between different sources of EU fundamental rights has only partially been addressed in primary law. Articles 52(3) and 53 CFR cover the rela tion between the CFR and the ECHR but not between the CFR and the general principles of law under Article 6(3) TEU. The Treaty has left his question very much to the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). 3 The first cases decided since the entry into binding force of the Charter do not yet indicate that the EU courts have developed a clear position on whether the Charter is to mere ly become the EU courts' point of departure when dealing with the protection of fundamental rights or whether it is to become at least for the rights formulated 2 Much more has been written about the relationship between fundamental rights of the Union and fundamental freedoms. See e.g.: T. Georgopoulos, 'Libertés fondamentales communautaires et droits fondamentaux européens: le conflit n'aura pas lieu ' 1619 . 3 The question of the relation of the sources of fundamental rights in the EU legal order is not merely academic. It is, for example, also decisive for analysing the relevance of the so called 'optout' of parts of the Charter by the United Kingdom, Poland and the Czech Republic. Since the optout is explicitly related to specific parts of the Charter, the question remains whether the rights in the CFR to which the opt out refers, are nevertheless applicable as general principles of EU law.
therein a more or less exclusive source, eliminating for these the relevance of gen eral principles of law. Prior to entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, for example in Volker and Markus Schecke, the Court (Grand Chamber) held that a fundamen tal rights issue had to be assessed 'in the light of the provisions of the Charter' 4 thereby treating the Charter as 'the reference standard' 5 for the Union in ensuring respect for fundamental rights.
The postLisbon caselaw of the CJEU to date does not yet seem to indicate a clear preference for any possible solution to the problem. Specifically with regard to the right to effective judicial protection, both the General Court (GC) and the Court of Justice (CJ) have used as a starting point of analysis the rights arising from general principles of law. In Winner Wetten, for instance, where the CJ, fol lowing the Opinion of AG Bot, stated that '(…) according to settled caselaw, the principle of effective judicial protection is a general principle of Union law (…) which has also been reaffirmed by Article 47 of the Charter of fundamental rights of the European Union.' 6 Similarly in AJD Tuna, it stated that Article 47 CFR was merely 'the reaffirmation of the principle of effective judicial protection, which is a general principle of Community law stemming from the constitutional tradi tions common to the Member States.' 7 The GC in Fulmen, similarly, while analys ing the applicant's complaint regarding the infringement of his right to effective judicial protection, first referred to the right to effective judicial protection as general principle of law before mentioning that it has also been enshrined in Ar ticle 47 of the Charter. 8 In other cases, a parallel application of the different sources seems to be preferred by the Union judge, listing different sources of a legal principle in the CFR and the ECHR by way of example. The case Interseroh of March 2012 illustrates this approach. The Court, after having referred to the Charter's Articles providing for the rights concerned in that case, namely Articles 15(1), 16 and 17 CFR, empha sised that: '[m]oreover, according to settled caselaw, both the right to property and the freedom to pursue a trade or business are general principles of European Union law.'
9 Thereby the Court not only linked the CFR rights to the preexisting caselaw of the Court but also explained that these rights had the character of general principles of law. 10 Other formulations which might be read as acknowl edging a plurality of sources have recently been used in, for example the case Chakroun 11 and the case Salahadin Abdulla, 12 indicating that a right arises 'in particular', 'notamment' or 'insbesondere' in the Charter. Such formulations point specifically at one source, generally the Charter, but take care not to exclude other possible sources of rights, such as general principles of EU law. 13 The Gen eral Court (GC) in Slovak Telekom v. Commission 14 has adopted a similar line of reasoning with regard to the right to good administration not only stated for in Article 41 CFR, but also protected as principle in the EU judicature's caselaw. 15 Overall, absent any hard case in which a clear decision would have been indispens able, the general trend of the courts has been to use the Charter less as an exclusive source of fundamental rights and more as either a point of departure for an anal ysis or as one of several possible sources of rights. Establishing pluralism or a hierarchy of sources of fundamental rights in the EU legal order?
The debate in academia on this question has been so far mainly influenced by arguments which, on one hand, are predominantly concerned with the system atic coherence and transparency of EU law and, on the other hand, appear to be concerned with the promotion of a 'constitutional identity' in the EU. Several authors, however, appear to argue in favour of what might be called a 'hierarchic' understanding placing the Charter as the primary source of rights in the Union. Fundamental rights protected as general principles in this view are held to be only subsidiary sources of protection, 16 applicable as fillers of otherwise intolerable gaps 'as a sort of safety net for cases where the Charter is silent.'
17 This approach would result in an exclusive application of one or another source of rights to any given situation -either rights arising from the Charter or from general principles of law. Such understanding would appear to run counter to an understanding of several overlapping complementary sources applicable in parallel to any given situation. Some proponents of a hierarchic position argue that if the Charter did not take precedence over the general principles of EU law, the legal system would run the risk of lacking transparency, since positive law would increasingly be replaced by judgemade law and a parallel structure of protection of fundamental rights might appear;
18 this would risk bypassing the intention of the constitutional legislator. Crucial to any such argument, however, is the definition of a 'gap' in protection. Under which conditions could a codified fundamental right be filled by subsidiary reference to a general principle of law? If a fundamental right is formulated in the Charter with a more narrow scope of protection than the courts have granted under the protection of general principles of EU law, the question would subse quently arise as to the consequences thereof. Could general principles of EU law be used to expand the right or fill the gap?
19 When arguing such a position of 16 hierarchy, the answer to such questions will depend on several factors. One is the intention of the constitutional legislator. Is the narrow formulation intended to be a limitation of a specific right? Is it an explicit limitation of the powers the Union had previously enjoyed? Or, is the narrow formulation flowing from the wording of the Charter to be interpreted only as a 'partial clarification' of a certain right, which does not exclude the continuous application of the unwritten gen eral principles of law to questions which are not subject to the partial codification of that right into the CFR? In this context, the frame of reference according to which it is to be decided whether the Charter offers sufficient protection also needs to be defined. It would appear that a 'gap' in protection of rights under the CFR could only be defined by reference to a comparative benchmark, notably, the general principles of law as referred to in Article 6(3) TEU. Only by referring to the larger scope of protection of the fundamental rights as general principles of law is it possible to review the Charter as to whether it 'sufficiently' protects the rights of citizens or leaves gaps which are to be filled by application of general principles of law.
20 This is where, in our view, the problem of logic of a hierarchi cal, exclusive approach lies: Even when following the logic of the hierarchical view, a parallel analysis of the definition of the fundamental rights as established by the Charter, on the one hand, and the fundamental rights protected as general prin ciples of law, on the other hand, is a requirement to establish the gap. Differences in view exist as to whether in the scope of application of the Charter, the latter should remain the exclusive source or merely one amongst many.
Another potential problem of the approach towards establishing a 'hierarchy of sources' of fundamental rights, 21 is that it has difficulties explaining the presence rights that derive from general principles affording greater protection than the fundamental rights in the Charter cannot be ruled out. of rights defined in the CFR only by way of example. As AG Maduro, for example, recalled in his opinion in max.mobile, there are some rights which are so broadly defined that their content as subjective individual rights becomes sufficiently pre cise only in the case of concretisation of the right(s) at issue in clearly defined subcategories or in legislation. 22 This category of broadly formulated fundamen tal rights in the EU legal order, includes for example the rights to 'human dignity' (Article 1 CFR) and to 'good administration' (Article 41 CFR) as well as the right to an effective judicial remedy before a tribunal (Article 47 CFR). These 'um brella' rights or principles have in common that their capacity to confer subjective rights on individuals depends on the concretisation of their content. Such concre tisation can take place either in the Treaty provisions or by secondary legislation establishing a clearer contour of the rights protected and their limitations. 23 The formulation of the right to good administration in Article 41 CFR illustrates this concept by way of a nonexhaustive list of examples. The formulation 'this right includes' shows that the list of subprinciples giving subjective rights to individu als can also be developed in the context of general principles of law in the caselaw of the courts. 24 Consequently, a right which is itself defined by a mixture of, in part, written subconcepts and, in part, unwritten general principles of law, could be regarded as a powerful example to emphasise the need of accepting a pluralism of sources in the sense of a nonhierarchical relation between rights possibly for mulated in the Charter and rights as general principles of EU law.
However, the wider debate on the nature of rights conferred by Treaty provisions in the Charter and by general principles of law, often rests on -occasionally un stated -conceptual premises of the nature of written versus unwritten sources of rights: Positively formulated rights in a Charter are often understood to be more precise than unwritten general principles of law. 25 The argument is that for the in order to justify a legal challenge, one must be able to invoke, if not violation of an acquired right, at least a personal interest.' 24 The following discussion of the concept of good administration will illustrate this point fur ther.
25 See e.g., a recent example: M. de Mol, Case Note -'Kückückdevici: Mangold Revisited', 6 European Constitutional Law Review (2010) p. 293308, at p. 301 without further references sup solution of a specific case, a more precise rule should be given precedence over a more abstract general principle and the latter would only be used merely as an interpretative tool for the positively formulated right. 26 In this view, the courts should yield to the (constitutional) legislature's decision to define a right in a specific manner.
27 Although it appears in itself theoretically sound, in our view the main problem with this concept is that reality does not always comply with theory. In view of the reality of the formulation of rights in the Charter, it appears difficult to claim that the rights enumerated in the CFR are always more con cretely formulated than the rights arising as general principles of law in the caselaw of the courts. Some quite precisely defined rights have been recognised as general principles of law, such as the protection of legitimate expectations or the non retroactivity of criminal sanctions, to name just a few. 28 These should be inter preted to have the effect of granting subjective individual rights as well as functioning as organisational principles of the legal system. 29 On the other hand, broadly formulated concepts and rights which require further precision (such as, e.g., the freedom to conduct a business under Article 16 CFR) or umbrella rights are often less precisely formulated than rights respected as General Principles of EU law, which are applied to specify these general notions within the Charter. The Court of Justice therefore, in our view rightfully, recently explicitly acknowledged this with regard to the individual's right to an effective remedy before a tribunal. 30 porting this specific definition of general principles of law claims that 'general principles are abstract in the sense that they point in the direction of a certain direction rather than giving concrete rules of law. Besides that they are unwritten and unpublished (…). Arguably, general principles need to be expressed in legislation before they can apply with regard to private individuals. 29 See for example D. Simon, 'Y atil des principes généraux du droit communautaire?', 14 Droits (1991) p. 7386 at p. 7879 who describes how structural principles and subjective in dividual rights may be part of general principles of law and may be balanced against each other in cases of conflict. But: see above in the discussion on transparency of the legal system that this concept does not seem to be uncontested. 30 The latter is merely 'the reaffirmation of the principle of effective judicial protection, which is a general principle of Community law stemming from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States.' See: C221/09 AJD Tuna [2011] ECR Inyr of 17 March 2011, para. 54 with Second, the fact that Article 6 TEU makes no reference to the fundamental freedoms enshrined in the TFEU can also be understood as an intention of the constitutional legislator to confer on the EU courts the power to act as the arbiter between the different and -on occasion -competing or overlapping sources of fundamental rights. Technically speaking, all fundamental rights in the Union, irrespective of their source, function as legal 'principles'. The latter do not mutu ally exclude each other; instead, they require comparison and balancing, with the objective of maximisation of their respective scopes of applicability. 31 In this view and having regard to the existing caselaw of the courts, all different possible sources of fundamental rights and fundamental freedoms in the EU have to be taken into account in such a balancing exercise designed to maximise the possible applicability of each single right. Not giving precedence to the visible rights en shrined in the Charter, some fear, would undermine the contribution of the Char ter to an emerging constitutional identity of the Union. 32 This argument results from hopes of the emergence of pride in the European constitutional values in the form of a veritable 'Verfassungspatriotismus'. In our view, the pluralism of sources should not in itself be seen as detrimental to the transparency of the legal system of the EU. Neither the Charter's intelligibility nor its accessibility are reduced by a parallel existence and applicability of written rights and of unwritten general principles of law. 33 Moreover, the constitutional identity of the Union, including postLisbon, is a dynamic system based on merging different legal traditions by mutual crossfertilisation of concepts and ideas. The inclusion of the Charter into primary law was not designed to jettison 'one of the truly original features of the preCharter constitution', which was the ability to draw on the constitutional traditions of the member states. 34 integration of the member states' legal sources in the construction of a joint legal system on the European level. 35 Not surprisingly, therefore, the debates in the Convention explicitly acknowledged that the enumeration of fundamental rights cannot be regarded as final in terms of exhaustiveness, but will be over time re interpreted in view of the evolution of the society and the questions arising before the EU courts. The Charter, in this sense, does not mark an entirely new start in the application of fundamental rights in the Union. 36 Instead, it is designed to be a document which makes transparent the acquis, developed over decades of case law, 'by making those rights more visible in a Charter.' 37 How does a pluralistic approach work in reality?
For all practical purposes, therefore, the sources of fundamental rights listed in Article 6 TEU should be understood as being in a nonhierarchical, complimen tary relationship. However, this pluralistic understanding does not exclude that the Court, in reviewing a specific case, could apply to the list of sources contained in Article 6 TEU what might be referred to as a lexical reading. 38 Under this, the analysis of a case would begin by first looking at a fundamental freedom such as provided for in the TFEU and the fundamental rights applicable in the case, as they arise in the first place from the Charter, and next reviewing the rights as aris ing from general principles of EU law.
39 Doing so respects the notion of institu tional balance (Article 13(2) TEU), 40 and reflects the fact that courts are, on the other hand, required to ensure that the legislator, including the constitutional legislator, complies with the general principles of EU law. 41 This lexical ordering of sources should not, however, be misunderstood as acknowledging some sort of hierarchy of sources of fundamental rights in the EU legal order. It aims more at acknowledging the coexistence of the various fundamental rights' sources with the final aim of providing a high level of protection of individuals' rights. An ex ample of this approach has been given by AG Bot in MM. 42 In analyzing the right to be heard, he first turned to the right to good administration, the observance of which 'is required not only of the EU institutions, by virtue of Article 41(2)(a) of the Charter', but then also turns to general principles of law. He finds that 'because it constitutes a general principle of EU law', the authorities of each of the Member States are bound by the obligation to grant a fair hearing when they adopt deci sions falling within the scope of EU law, even when the applicable legislation does not expressly provide for such a procedural requirement.' 43 Case study: good administration
In this second part of the article, we will put the results of the normativetheoret ical considerations in the first part to the test of a case study. The reallife relevance of the question of the relation between rights as formulated in the Charter and general principles of law will be studied by using the example of the right to good administration as defined in Article 41 CFR and the general principle of good ple is formulated in a concrete manner in a directive. The AG considered that since the content of general principles is much 'less clear and precise', there would be a danger that the harmonization objective of the Directive in issue would be undermined and the legal certainty which it seeks to achieve would be jeopardized. The general principle could nonetheless be used as criteria to review the legality of the directive. 41 K. Lenaerts and GutiérrezFons, 'The Constitutional Allocutions of Powers and General Prin ciples of EU Law', 47 CMLRev (2010) p. 16291669, at p. 16291630: 'Horizontally, as a source of "primary law", general principles may limit the discretion enjoyed by the EU legislature. When giving expression to a general principle, the EU legislature must respect the essential content of that general principle. Otherwise, the resulting legislation could be declared void. Thus, the application of general principles may result in setting aside the choices favoured by the legislature at either na tional or supranational level.' Maybe the most prominent example in this regard is the recognition of the 'rule of law' as general principle in Les Verts. Case administration as it has been developed in the caselaw over time. It appears that there are considerable differences between good administration as a fundamental right defined in Article 41 CFR and as a general principle of law acknowledged by the caselaw of the EU courts.
Background to good administration
The notion of good administration in the legal system of the EU is still evolving. It is perhaps best understood as a framework concept on the basis of the rule of law and principles of procedural justice which draws together a range of rights, rules and principles guiding administrative procedures with the aim of ensuring procedural justice, public administrative adherence to the rule of law, and sound outcomes for administrative procedures. Notions of 'good', 44 'sound', 45 or 'prop er' 46 administration have been referred to by the EU courts since their very first decisions in administrative matters. 47 The origins of specific procedural principles aimed at ensuring satisfactory outcomes of decisionmaking reach back into the public law of the member states, particularly concerned with ensuring proce dural fairness through rules and principles for administrative procedures. 48 Many aspects of the principle of good administration are linked to the requirements of information management by the administrative authorities. These include the 'duty of care' requiring full and impartial investigation of a fact set prior to decision making including, where necessary, the use of scientific evidence and the obligation of adequate reasoning of a decision. Other information related aspects of the right to good administration concern defence rights of individuals and more general 44 containing five fundamental principles: the right to be heard; the right of access to information; the right to assistance and representation; the obligation to provide reasons for decisions; and finally the obligation to notify affected parties of remedies available against an act of the administration. The Resolution did not however use the term 'good administration.' public rights of access to documents. 49 The development of the principles of good administration is directly related to the system of judicial review in the CJEU and the role afforded therein to the pleas of the parties. Nehl has rightly observed that the dynamism of the principle of good administration arises inter alia from its interaction with the particularities of the system of judicial review in the EU, which to a large degree is based on the binding nature of the applicant's pleas. The courts, feeling 'generally bound to give an express response' to applicants' pleas entices litigants to take up the judges' response to former pleas in future litigation. 50 A direct consequence a dialogue evolves, with lawyers from various legal traditions and pleading legal concepts in different languages leading to an unavoidably open endedness of legal concepts developed by the caselaw. Good administration, 51 therefore, has also been described as an 'obligation', 52 59 a 'principle', 60 as well as a 'general principle' of EU law, 61 prior to being formulated additionally as a funda mental right in the Charter.
The CFR is innovative and conservative at the same time when it comes to the notion of good administration. It is innovative, in so far as it is one of the first European and even international charters of fundamental rights explicitly recognis ing good administration as containing subjective procedural rights. 62 The content of Article 41 CFR is inspired by the caselaw of the CJEU in its approach to en suring that the demands of the rule of law in administrative procedures are met.
63
The right to good administration was also one of the first rights enumerated in the Charter to be cited in the caselaw of the EU courts in terms of subjective rights of individuals prior to the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon conferring binding legal force to the CFR. 64 On the other hand, when compared with the caselaw of the CJEU on the principle of good administration, the formulation of Article 41 CFR appears limited in its material, institutional and personal scope. Therefore, the interpretation of a right under the Charter as opposed to granting the same right as a general principle of law established in the caselaw of the EU courts has the potential to change the outcome of a case. The position taken by the EU courts will be decisive for the future development of the notion of good administration.
Material scope of protection: are all aspects of administrative activities covered?
The material scope of protection (ratione materiae) of good administration is con siderably different according to whether one analyses it in the perspective of the right to good administration under Article 41 CFR or whether one looks at the 63 The Explanations to the text of the Charter prepared by the Presidium of the Convention confirm this approach by stating that 'Article 41 is based on the existence of the Union as subject to the rule of law whose characteristics were developed in the caselaw which enshrined inter alia good administration as a general principle of law. general principle of good administration as understood by the EU courts within the caselaw. The wording of Article 41 CFR indicates that the material scope of protection of good administration is intended to cover 'single case decisionmak ing', which in the literature is also occasionally referred to via the American term of 'adjudication'. This assumption specifically arises from the examples which Article 41(2) CFR gives in order to illustrate the nature of good administration. The latter 'include' the right of an individual to be heard before the administration takes an 'individual measure which would affect him or her adversely', access of a person to 'his or her' (specific) file, and the obligation to give reasons for admin istrative decisions -as opposed to the broader obligation of stating reasons in all 'legal acts' of the Union in Article 296 paragraph 1 TFEU.
65
By contrast, the principles of good administration as flowing from the EU courts' caselaw cover a broader material scope applying also to executive 'rule making' in the form of the creation of nonlegislative acts with abstractgeneral content. Therefore, the right to good administration, when understood as a gen eral principle of EU law is not limited to single case decisionmaking. The CJEU has repeatedly and without further discussion applied the principle of good ad ministration to acts as criteria for the legality of acts of nonlegislative rulemaking in the context of an action for annulment brought by individuals. One example is international (association) agreements, the enforcement of which is also reviewed in the light of the principle of good administration. 66 This was the approach taken, for example, by the Court in Alliance for Natural Health 67 as well as in
Monsanto in which the Court reviewed a Commission's decision on the inclusion of a pharmacologically active substance into a Regulation's annex -a power del egated by the legislator to the Commission and which was to be pursued by ap plication of a regulatory committee (comitology) procedure. 'Such a decision', the Court held, must 'be adopted by the Commission pursuant to the principle of sound administration and the duty of care.'
68
Personal scope of protection: good administrationa structural principle or an individuals' subjective right?
The personal scope of protection of the right to good administration differs con siderably depending on whether it is a fundamental right enumerated in the CFR or a fundamental right protected as general principle of EU law. In this context, one of the essential questions is whether good administration is a structural prin ciple of the Union defined in objective terms seeking to ensure the administrative efficiency or whether and under which conditions it grants subjective rights to individuals. One of the innovative aspects of the Charter is to explicitly acknowl edge, in Article 41 CFR, good administration in the language of subjective human rights. 69 However, the Court did not annul the Commission's contested act on that basis, since it concluded that the appellant had not established that the decision at issue was not actually, in that specific case, adopted in disregard of the principle of sound administration and the duty of care. para. 93 of the judgment indicates that the principle of sound administration would be a criteria an individual plaintiff can invoke as reason for the il legality of a regulatory act adopted by the Commission. It reads that: 'In the present case, Monsanto Company has not established (…) that, in the light of the circumstances prevailing, the decision at issue was adopted in disregard of the principle of sound administration and the duty of care.' This approach of the courts is reflected in legislative acts delegating powers to the Commission in order to adopt regulatory acts. administration covered by Article 41 CFR confer subjective rights to individuals and which should be regarded as merely structural or 'objective' principles. These discussions take place against the background of Article 52(5) CFR, which estab lishes specific rules in situations where the Charter merely contains 'principles' which shall 'be judicially cognisable only' in view of 'legislative and executive acts' by the EU or member states; these are opposed to 'rights and freedoms' under Article 52(1) CFR, recognised by the Charter, which require a legal act of the EU or the member states not for their recognition but for their limitation. 70 This distinction removes the category of 'principles' from the scope of subjective indi vidual rights having direct effect. 71 This question arises in the context of both notions of good administration -the rights in Article 41 CFR as well as the good administration recognised as general principle of EU law in the caselaw of the courts -being formulated as an 'umbrella' concepts. Good administration is, in other words, a 'nonautonomous right' insofar as it is, like the rule or law, defined by its component parts only. Understanding the details of protection, however, is complicated by the fact that EU law 'is not very principled when it comes to the use of the term principle.' 70 Dominguez appears to be the only case to date at the occasion on which the Court was invited to ascertain whether the provision in issue was a 'right' or a 'principle' for the purposes of Arts. 51 (1) and 52(5) 5) CFR state that the distinction between 'rights' and 'principles' is based on the notion that subjective rights shall be respected, whereas principles shall be observed. Principles may be implemented through legislative or executive acts; accordingly, they become significant for the courts only when such acts are interpreted or reviewed. They do not however give rise to direct claims for positive action by the Union's institutions or Members States authorities. The distinction formulated in Art. 52 CFR, however, explicitly applies only to the fundamental rights in the context of Art. 6(1) TEU and not to those arising from Art. 6(3) CFR. 71 The effect of the distinction between 'rights' and 'principles' in reality distinguishes between the 'subjective' and 'objective' rights -see T. example, distinguished the 'general principle' of good administration from the more specific rights of defence. The Court held that only the latter were capable of conferring subjective rights on individuals. 73 More recently in SPM, the Court stated that the right to good administration confers subjective rights on individu als when it constitutes the expression of specific rights such as, inter alia, the right of an individual to have his or her affairs handled impartially, fairly and within a reasonable time or his or her right to be heard. 74 These definitions are in line with the concept of good administration as an umbrella principle, which in itself is an objective principle only, and grants specific subjective rights through its component principles.
However, ambiguities persist on the conditions under which subjective rights could arise from subcomponents of the right to good administration in the EU legal order. For example, AG Poiares Maduro, in his Opinion in max.mobil, at tempted to differentiate the subcomponents of good administration according to their respective 'objective' or 'subjective' functions. In his view, the obligation of diligent and impartial examination established by caselaw had an objective scope, being carried out by reference to the general interest of sound administration and the proper application of the rules of the Treaty. He reached this view by com parison with the rights which might be conferred on interested parties to intervene directly in a procedure concerning them, such as the right to be heard and the right of access to the file. Unlike those rights, in his view, the obligation to diligent and impartial investigation could not create a subjective right. In the same vein, Nehl argues in favour of distinguishing between 'the right to be heard and the right to access to the file' which 'clearly emphasize the protective function, where as the principle of care and the duty to state reasons' merely constitute 'process standards' 'ensuring the rationality of the procedure's final outcome.' 75 Probably the most prominent case of this kind to date is Tillack -a case on accusations of bribery made against an investigative journalist by the EU's anti fraud unit, OLAF. 76 In the context of a damages' claim brought by the journalist 73 Joined cases 33/79 and 75/79 Kuhner v. Commission [1980] ECR 1677, para. 25. This is the case in which the Court, for the first time, refers to good administration as a general principle of EU law; it finds nevertheless that subjective individual rights arise only from its specific manifesta tions, namely the rights of defence. 76 The Commission's antifraud office (OLAF) had accused Tillack, an investigative journalist who was working at the time in Brussels, of bribery of its officials. In seeking to defend his rights, eclr_9-1.indb 90 3/21/2013 5:12:12 PM against the EU, the GC found that the (umbrella) principle of good administration 'does not, in itself, confer rights upon individuals.' 77 It held that subjective rights may arise from the principle of sound administration only insofar as it 'constitutes the expression of specific rights such as the right to have affairs handled impar tially, fairly and within a reasonable time, the right to be heard, the right to have access to files, or the obligation to give reasons for decisions, for the purposes of Article 41 of the Charter of fundamental rights of the European Union.' 78 At first sight, when taken literally, this formula seems to indicate that the right to good administration would confer subjective rights on individuals exclusively in the context of those concepts explicitly listed in Article 41 CFR, leaving no space for subjective individual rights arising from other associated general principles of law. Such a reading of the Tillack-formula would thus impose a quite far reaching limitation regarding the personal scope of protection of rights under good admin istration and incidentally would also have implicit far reaching consequences for the relation between the different sources of fundamental rights listed in Articles 6 TEU. Nonetheless, it would appear to us that such a farreaching interpretation of the Tillack-formula does not do justice to the intentions of the Court. When read in context, it appears that the Court in Tillack repeatedly insisted on the fact that the mere 'classification as an "act of maladministration" by the Ombudsman does not mean, in itself, that OLAF's conduct constitutes a sufficiently serious breach of a rule of law within the meaning of the caselaw.' 79 The focus seemed to be on the differentiation between claims of maladministration made by the Om budsman, on one hand, and the rights to good administration, on the other. Seen in this light, the focus was less on the differentiation between rights under Article 41 CFR and rights arising as general principles of law. Other preLisbon cases support this understanding of subjective individual rights arising from the prin ciple of good administration. They combine the general evocation of the principle of good administration with the more specific duty of a full and impartial inves Tillack first turned to the European Ombudsman, who, in a wellresearched and strongly worded report, accused OLAF of serious maladministration. Tillack then also brought an action for annul ment combined with an action for damages against the activity of OLAF before the GC (then the Court of First Instance tigation of the facts prior to decisionmaking (duty of care), 80 or the right to a fair hearing.
81 Such claims are in some cases summarized under the heading of the principle of good or sound administration and used as basis for awarding dam ages to a party. 82 In other cases, the claims are explicitly based on the duty of care, which, although not explicitly listed in Article 41 CFR, is generally understood as a key component of good administration and has also been explicitly acknowl edged as conferring subjective rights on which the individuals could rely against the administration.
83 Most importantly, the formulation the GC had adopted in Tillack appears to have been repealed in the later cases. In Franchet and Byk 84 for instance, the GC held that the principle of sound or good administration could give rise to subjective individual rights on the basis of rights and principles not explicitly enumerated in the list of Article 41 CFR. The plaintiffs, Franchet and Byk, successfully relied on the principle of sound administration as implying a requirement for OLAF to maintain the confidential nature of an investigation prior to the establishment of any wrongdoing. 85 Therefore, despite the fact that a 'right to confidentiality' was not explicitly listed in Article 41 CFR, the GC held that by virtue of the principle of sound administration, 'the administration must avoid giving the press information concerning disciplinary proceedings which might damage the official concerned.' 86 Consequently, the Commission was ordered to pay damages for a breach, by OLAF, of the obligation to maintain the confi dentiality of investigations.
Possible explanations for this development might be, on the one hand, that in order to reach such a conclusion, the GC implicitly made use of the verb 'includ ing' 87 84 In this case, some internal audits of Eurostat had revealed possible irregularities in financial management. OLAF opened a number of investigations and sent to the Luxembourg and French judicial authorities files relating to investigations implicating individual wrongdoing warranting criminal investigations. Mr Franchet and the Mr Byk contested the fact that they had not been informed or heard before the files concerning them were forwarded to the national judicial authori ties as well as the fact that OLAF had supplied the press with confidential personal information about them. 85 exhaustive list of rights and principles to be added under the umbrella notion of good administration. On the other hand, one may suggest that in reaching such a conclusion, the GC merely referred to the general principle of good administra tion as flowing from previous caselaw and not to the right to good administration as stated in the Charter. This latter explanation is all the more plausible insofar as the Court's wording in the present case merely referred to the 'principle of sound administration' 88 and the 'interests of sound administration' and not to the 'right' to good administration as such. 89 In this, Franchet and Byk also is an example of applied pluralism of sources of fundamental rights in the EU legal order. Such a reading of the possibilities of subjective individual rights arising from the notion of good administration also appears to be in compliance with a pragmatic reading of the second sentence of Article 52 (5) CFR, which finds that principles 'shall be judicially cognisable only in the interpretation of [legislative and executive] acts and in the ruling on their legality.' The reason for the distinction between rights/ freedoms in Article 52(1) and principles in 52(5) CFR is that the latter merely constitute programmatic objectives which have to or might be implemented, 90 being therefore incapable to confer subjective rights on individuals. 91 While the umbrella notion of good administration is thus a principle under the concept of 52(5) CFR, the subconcepts may be rights or freedoms under Article 52(1) CFR. The umbrella notion is made concrete by the constitutional legislature in Article 41 CFR, by the ordinary legislature in specific legislation and by courts applying general principles of EU law. 88 91 This distinction between 'rights' and 'principles' seems to have followed the Spanish example, having regard that in the latter legal system, principles cannot normally constitute an independ ent ground for claiming subjective rights; they first have to be implemented in legislation; some principles may nevertheless have direct effect provided that they are formulated 'unconditionally'. Where that is not the case, the principle requires specification. This has been the requirement of the courts regarding general principles of law and is now also codified in Article 52(5) CFR. 93 This approach should, in our view, guide the definition of whether good administration is a subjective right of individuals or whether it merely is an objective principle -irrespective of whether a specific sub notion of good administration is explicitly referred to in Article 41 CFR or not. Using the question of whether a right or principle is sufficiently 'clear and uncon ditional' as to be capable of directly conferring rights on individuals or not saves searching for difficulttodefine notions of legislative intention in creating a right. 92 Using the terminology of 'clear and unconditional' we would deliberately evoke the caselaw on the possibilities of direct effect of EU law granting individuals rights enforceable vis-à-vis mem ber states even when the relevant obligations were initially formulated to bind the member state towards the Union or were simply defined in negative terms as the obligation of a member state not to undertake a certain measure: See, e.g., the famous and path breaking case C26/62 Van Gend en Loos [1963] ECR 1, paras. 10, 12, 13 which stated that 'rights arise not only where they are ex pressly granted by the Treaty, but also by reason of obligations which the Treaty imposes in a clearly defined way.' 'The wording of Article 12 contains a clear and unconditional prohibition which is not a positive but a negative obligation.' This produces 'direct effects in the relationship between the Member States and their subjects.' The 'direct effect' notion stated for in Van Gend en Loos implies, in reality, the 'ability' of a legal norm to create by itself rights and obligations that the individuals may enforce before their respective national courts. A legal norm such as a fundamental right for instance will therefore be 'able' to create such rights and obligations in as much as it is 'clear, suf ficiently precise and unconditional' (In some cases, the Court added a supplementary condition, namely that the legal norm also be 'complete ' principes], façonnera indéniablement la portée des dispositions de la Charte ( ). Elle ne saurait toutefois remettre en cause l'acquis de l'Union ( ). Bien au con traire, elle en renforcera les fondements.' Cases on fundamental rights as general principles of EU law regarding umbrella principles such as for example the rule of law, follow this approach. They break down the umbrella notion into subcomponents such as the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations. Subjective individual rights arise only in the context of the subprinciple.
Also, it avoids understanding the subjective and objective nature of a right as mutually exclusive. Instead, it opens the view that subjective and objective com ponents of a legal principle might be two sides of the same coin. Where a subjec tive right exists, an objective obligation might arise from that, but also an objective obligation of the administration might result, when clear and unconditional, in a subjective right of an individual.
The 'subjective/objective' rationales of the good administration notion seem therefore to be interlinked, flowing respectively from one another. The 'subjective' right to good administration implies, in reality, an 'objective' meaning. It is essentially construed as the reflection of the obligations imposed on the adminis tration to act in a certain way. In this sense, the 'subjective' right to good admin istration is recognized in terms of structural objective obligations. A contrario, the administration's 'obligation' would also be an individual's 'right'. As a result of this analysis, the 'subjective' and 'objective' rationales of the right to good administra tion are, in reality, corresponding rights. 94 On the basis of the approach to distinguish subjective rights which are charac terized by their 'clear and unconditional' content and objective principles which arise as obligations of the administration only due to their lack of clarity or con ditionality (i.e., relying on further acts or subprinciples to make them appear sufficiently clear and unconditional) we might differ from these opinions. The obligation of diligent and impartial investigation in the form of the Court's inter pretation of the duty of care is interpreted as the obligation to undertake a full and impartial assessment of all relevant facts of the case prior to taking a decision. This is an obligation which in our view is sufficiently clear and precise to be in terpreted also to contain a right of an individual to claim such investigation. This approach is in line with the the Court, which found in the leading case on the duty of care as a subcomponent of the general principle of good administration that there are elements of the principle of good administration which, although having an 'objective' nature, also confer 'subjective' rights on individuals.
Good administration, as public law in general, has therefore two facets. It is a general structural principle seeking to ensure the efficiency of the administration, as well as a notion capable of rendering subjective rights on individuals. This underlines the dual purpose of public law and of the notion of good administra tion consisting in maintaining efficient decisionmaking on the part of the admin 94 In the same vein, see also istration whilst equally providing individuals with the possibility of defending themselves against encroachments into their rights. 95 In that context, a virtuous circle could evolve. Normatively speaking, procedural rights of individuals should be used as tools for safeguarding good administrative practices by the executive institutions and bodies, leading more often than not to good outcomes. 96 Protect ing the individuals' rights in this context would therefore be synonymous with ensuring efficiency of public administration and protecting it against rash, incon siderate or even unduly biased decisions.
Institutional scope of protection: good administration, the implementation of EU law by the member states and composite procedures Whilst good administration protected as a general principle of EU law (Article 6(3) TEU) is applicable to all member state action in the scope of EU law, the institutional scope of the right to good administration under Article 41(1) CFR is limited to 'institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the Union.'
97 Still more limited are the formulations regarding damages and language rights (Article 41(3), (4) CFR) which speak of 'institutions' and 'servants in the performance of their duties' respectively. 98 Generally, within legal doctrine these differences are glossed 95 This truism is also recalled by L. Azoulaï, 'Le principe de bonne administration', in J.B. Auby and J. Duteil de la Rochère (eds.) Droit administratif européen (Bruylant, Bruxelles 2007) p. 493 518, at p. 509: 'Cette combinaison reflète, à vrai dire, une tension qui est au Coeur même de tout ordre administratif en voie de constitution et qui découle de la nécessite d'assurer à la fois l'efficacité de l'administration et la protection des droits et intérêts des administres.' 96 See, e.g., Case C269/90 TU München [1991] ECR I5469, paras. 13 and 14: '(…) since an administrative procedure entailing complex technical evaluations is involved, the Commission must have a power of appraisal in order to be able to fulfil its tasks. However, where the Com munity institutions have such a power of appraisal, respect for the rights guaranteed by the Com munity legal order in administrative procedures is of even more fundamental importance. Those guarantees include, in particular, the duty of the competent institution to examine carefully and impartially all the relevant aspects of the individual case, the right of the person concerned to make his views known and to have an adequately reasoned decision. Only in this way can the Court verify whether the factual and legal elements upon which the exercise of the power of appraisal depends were present.' 97 The Presidium Explanation on Art. 41 CFR suggests that 'the expression "institutions, bodies, offices and agencies" is commonly used in the Treaties to refer to all the authorities set up by the Treaties or by secondary legislation.' Arts. 42 and 43 CFR on access to documents and access to the European Ombudsman use the same formula. Also do Art. 15 TFEU on transparency as well as Art. 298 TFEU creating the legal basis for a regulation on procedures for an open, efficient, and independent European administration.
98 Art. 340(2) TFEU contains a similarly limited formulation which obliges the Union to make good damages caused by the 'institutions or by its servants in the performance of their duties.' approach. It results in a complex system designed to protect various types of rights of individuals such as traditional defence rights, rights of democratic participation, social and economic rights as well as innovative procedural rights. Therefore, the Union's legal system continues to be an incubator of innovative legal solutions to new problems of European integration. One example of this dynamism in the field of fundamental rights protection is the development of good administration as a general principle of law and a fundamental right of individuals. The mosaic of sources of fundamental rights allows combining, on one hand, a transparent listing of acquired rights with, on the other hand, the flexibility necessary for further adjusting the protection of rights. This is necessary specifically in the context of a Union based on decentralized implementation of law and intense executive cooperation of actors from the European, national and international levels. Article 6 TEU therefore lists the Charter and the general principles of EU law on an equal footing. Neither the wording of Article 6 TEU nor, as the argu ments discussed in this article show, the teleological, systematic or contextual interpretation of the Treaties argue in favour of a hierarchical approach favouring the Charter over the general principles of law. Instead, a pluralist approach to overlapping and complementary protection by various sources is to be preferred.
Such considerations are, as this article illustrates, not merely of academic inter est. The material, personal and institutional scope of protection of the right to good administration under Article 41 CFR is considerably more restrictive than the scope of protection that is in fact offered by the EU courts under the general principle of good administration. The differences between the scope of protection of the right to good administration under Article 41 CFR and the general prin ciple of good administration as developed by the EU courts are an excellent ex ample to show the degree to which the fundamental rights granting individual protection may differ according to the source which is taken into account. Since EU law is implemented in a decentralised system by the member states in coop eration with each other and in cooperation with the Union institutions and bod ies, reference to the general principles of EU law is not only a possible safeguard of individuals' rights across jurisdictional borders, it is also a necessity, given the dynamic development of the EU system of executive cooperation. Good admin istration -especially in the absence of an EU general administrative procedure act -therefore provides an instructive case study for illustrating the necessity of a pluralistic approach to the interpretation of the sources of fundamental rights in the EU legal order. 
